Salinas v. State Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 40902 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-13-2014
Salinas v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40902
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Salinas v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40902" (2014). Not Reported. 1386.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1386
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF iDAHO 
ARTURO SALINAS, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. 40902 
ADA COUNTY NO. CV 2012-18119 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE LYNN NORTON 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
DIANE M. WALKER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #5920 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PETITIONER-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
RESPONDENT 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ..................................................................... 5 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 6 
I. The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Salinas' Petition 
For Post-Conviction Relief Without Conducting An Evidentiary 
Hearing On His Claim That He Received Ineffective Assistance 
Of Counsel When His Attorney Failed To File An Appeal On 
His Behalf And Failed To Consult With Him About An Appeal ................... 6 
A. Introduction ........................................................................................ 6 
8. Applicable Legal Standards .................................................................. 6 
1. Summary Dismissal Standards ........................................................ 6 
C. The District Court Applied An Incorrect Standard To 
Conflicting Affidavits At The Summary Dismissal Stage ....................... 8 
D. A Material Issue Of Fact Exists On Whether Mr. Steveley 
Rendered Deficient Performance When He Failed To File 
A Timely Notice Of Appeal On Mr. Salinas' Behalf And 
Failed To Adequately Consult With Mr. Salinas About 
Filing An Appeal .................................................................................... 9 
1. Ineffective Assistant Of Counsel Standards ................................... 11 
2. A Material Issue Of Fact Exists On Whether Mr. Salinas 
Instructed His Attorney To File An Appeal ..................................... 13 
3. Material Issue Of Fact Exists On Whether Mr. Salinas 
Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing 
To Consult With Mr. Salinas About His Appeal. ............................. 16 
4. Mr. Salinas Was Prejudiced By Mr. Steveley Failures 
Because Mr. Salinas Was Deprived Of Counsel At A 
Critical Stage Of The Proceedings And Denied 
Appellate Proceedings Altogether ................................................. 18 
II. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Find That 
Mr. Salinas Submitted Admissible Evidence For 
Consideration Of His Claims .................................................................... 18 
A. Introduction ...................................................................................... 18 
B. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed 
Mr. Salinas' Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Because 
Mr. Salinas Produced Sworn Pleadings Constituting 
Admissible Evidence To Support His Claims ...................................... 19 
Ill. Assuming That Mr. Salinas' Documents Lacked Sufficient 
Affirmation, The District Court's Decision To Dismiss The 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Based On This Rationale 
Should Be Reversed Because Mr. Salinas Lacked Any Notice 
That The District Court Would Be Ignoring His Evidence 
Based On This Reason, And Therefore, The Petition Was 
Dismissed On A Basis For Which He Had No Notice ............................... 23 
A. Introduction ...................................................................................... 23 
B. Mr. Salinas Received No Notice That The District Court 
Was Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
On The Basis That His Petition, Affidavit, And Other 
Evidence Were Not Sufficiently Certified To Be 
Admissible ...................................................................................... 23 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 24 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 25 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148 (2008) ................................................................ 7 
Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156 (Ct. App. 1986) .............................................. 23 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900 (2007) ..................................................... 7, 8 
Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho 128 (1978) ........................................................ 23 
Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 191 ( Ct. App. 1983) ................................................... 13 
Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76 (2002) .......................................................... 6 
Kellyv. State, 149 Idaho 517 (2010) ................................................................... 24 
Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434 ( 1991) ................................................ 8, 9 
Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813 (Ct. App. 1995) ............................................... 23 
Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588 (Ct. App. 1993) ......................................... 13, 14, 20 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274 (1998) ............................................................... 12 
Owen v. State, 130 Idaho 715 (1997) ................................................................... 8 
Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894 (Ct. App. 1993) .................................................... 14 
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671 (2010) ........................................................... 7, 23 
Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515 (1982) ............................................ 7 
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) ...................................... 13, 16, 17, 18 
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939 (Ct. App. 1990) ............................................... 13 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995) .................................................. 23 
State v. Beasley, 126 Idaho 356 (Ct. App. 1994) ................................................ 15 
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437 (2008) ........................................................... 7, 8 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ............................................ 11, 12 
iii 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) ..................................................... 12 
Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 144 (2009) .................................................................. 8 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) .............................................................. 12 
Statutes 
I.C. § 19-4902 ......................................................................................... 19, 20, 22 
I.C. § 19-4903 .................................................................................... 7, 19, 20, 22 
I.C. § 19-4906 ................................................................................................. 7, 23 
Rules 
Idaho Criminal Rule 57 ........................................................................................ 19 
Constitutional Provisions 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ............................................ 11 
Additional Citations 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function, (3d ed. 
1991), Defense Function, Standard 4-5.2(a)(v) ............................................... 16 
iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Arturo Salinas appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction 
relief, contending that there were genuine issues of material fact that supported his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Alternatively, he asserts that the district court 
improperly discredited his evidence for lack of proper certification and affirmation of 
truthfulness. In the further alternative, he asserts that the district court failed to give him 
any notice that his affidavits would not be considered because the certification or 
affirmation of truth was lacking. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing 
Mr. Salinas's petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Salinas pied guilty to the use of a deadly weapon during the commission of 
an aggravated battery. (Tr., p.10, Ls.1-4.) The district court imposed upon him a 
unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed. (R., p.5.) Four days after 
receiving the sentence, Mr. Salinas contacted his attorney, seeking a sentence 
reduction. (R., pp.126-127.) An Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion 
was filed and the district court denied it approximately 22 days after the judgment of 
conviction was filed. (R., p.45.) Mr. Salinas did not appeal the judgment of conviction 
or the denial of his Rule 35 motion. (R., p.5.) 
Mr. Salinas raised a number of claims in his timely verified petition for post-
conviction relief. (R., pp.4-7.) Relevant to the issue raised in this appeal, Mr. Salinas 
asserted that "Counsel was ineffective when he did not seek to file an appeal of the 
sentence imposed; nor did he even speak to [Mr. Salinas] regarding the possibility of 
1 
filing an appeal of the sentence imposed."1 (R., pp.5-6.) The district court appointed 
counsel to represent Mr. Salinas on the claims involving his appellate rights. (R., pp.45-
57.) 
The State filed a motion for summary dismissal, seeking dismissal of 
Mr. Salinas's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for his attorney's 
failure to consult with him about an appeal and to file an appeal. (R., pp.58-67.) The 
State asserted that Mr. Salinas never stated that he requested an appeal and that 
because the district court advised him of his rights to appeal the court's decision, 
Mr. Salinas's claims should be dismissed for failing to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact. (R., pp.64-66.) 
In his response, Mr. Salinas asserted that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel because his attorney did not file an appeal nor did the attorney consult with him 
about filing an appeal. (R., pp.91-92.) Mr. Salinas signed the response and provided 
an oath to its truthfulness. (R., p.93.) Additionally, Mr. Salinas filed an affidavit 
asserting that the public defender's office represented him and he contacted his 
1 Mr. Salinas raised a number of other claims: (1) the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction; (2) the sentence violated double jeopardy; (3) he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his attorney advised him to plead to a sentence that 
violated double jeopardy; (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his 
attorney told him that the weapon enhancement would be dismissed; (5) his conviction 
violated due process because the State was allowed to dismiss and refile charges; and 
(6) he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to move to 
dismiss the charges. (R., pp.4-7, 8-30.) The district court provided its notice of intent to 
dismiss these claims. (R., pp.45-57.) After waiting the requisite time period, the district 
court dismissed the claims for which it had provided notice. (R., pp.99-110.) Mr. Salinas 
does not raise any issues about the claims the district court dismissed in its 
December 12, 2012 order. 
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attorney immediately after his sentencing hearing "to appeal and [to] file a motion to 
reduce [his] sentence." (R., p.116.) 
The State filed a supplemental motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.123-127.) 
In it, the State argued that because the district court advised the petitioner of his right to 
appeal, the attorney had no duty to consult with the petitioner. (R., p.123.) The State 
also called into question the believability of Mr. Salinas' affidavit that he asked his 
attorney to file the appeal. (R., p.142.) 
In support of its request for dismissal, the State produced an affidavit of trial 
counsel, Craig Stevely. (R., pp.126-127.) Although the affidavit contained hearsay, it 
revealed that Mr. Salinas was not satisfied with the court's sentence imposed upon him 
and he requested that his attorney file something to reduce his sentence. (R., pp.126-
127.) Pursuant to this phone call received at the public defender's office, Mr. Steveley 
filed a Rule 35 Motion the same day the judgment was filed with the court. (R., pp.126-
127; see also Register of Actions of underlying criminal file attached as Appendix A.) 
Mr. Stevely asserted that Mr. Salinas never requested an appeal.2 (R., pp.126-127.) 
Mr. Steveley did not deny that he failed to consult with Mr. Salinas about whether to file 
an appeal. (See R., pp.126-127.) 
The district court summarily dismissed Mr. Salinas' claims that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney neither consulted with him about 
an appeal nor filed an appeal on his behalf. (R., pp.128-136.) The district court 
2 This statement is hearsay because Mr. Steveley received second hand information 
about what Mr. Salinas' wishes were about the sentence imposed when Mr. Salinas 
contacted the public defender's office four days after the sentence was imposed. 
(R., pp.126-127.) 
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concluded that no material issue of fact existed as to whether counsel's performance 
was deficient and whether the deficiency prejudices petitioner's case; therefore, 
dismissed Mr. Salinas' petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.136-137.) Mr. Salinas 
timely appealed. (R., pp.138-140.) 
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ISSUES 
1) Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Salinas' petition for post-conviction 
relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing on his claim that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file an appeal on his 
behalf and failed to consult with him about an appeal? 
2) Did the district court err when it failed to find that Mr. Salinas submitted 
admissible evidence for consideration of his claims? 
3) Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Salinas' post-conviction 
claims on grounds for which he was given no prior notice? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Salinas' Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief Without Conducting An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That He Received 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When His Attorney Failed To File An Appeal On His 
Behalf And Failed To Consult With Him About An Appeal 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Salinas asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his 
claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file 
an appeal on his behalf and failed to consult with him about an appeal. In his pleadings, 
Mr. Salinas asserted that his attorney failed to consult with him about whether to file an 
appeal and alleged that he told his attorney to file an appeal on his behalf.3 Because 
there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Mr. Salinas' counsel was 
ineffective, Mr. Salinas respectfully requests that the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel claims be vacated, with this case 
remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
1. Summary Dismissal Standards 
An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified 
3 As will be explained in Issue II, the district court erred when it erroneously discredited 
Mr. Salinas' affidavits and pleadings and gave them no weight. In the further 
alternative, if this Court finds reason to believe the record, affidavits, and pleadings 
were not sufficiently certified, then, as will be explained in Issue Ill, Mr. Salinas is 
entitled to notice before dismissing his claims on this ground. 
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with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. The 
application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations, 
or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id. 
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief when the 
court is satisfied the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by 
further proceedings. I.C. § 19-4906(b). In considering summary dismissal in a case 
where evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary dismissal may be appropriate, 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be 
responsible for resolving the conflict between the inferences. See State v. Yakovac, 145 
Idaho 437, 444 (2008) (addressing case where the State did not file a response to the 
petition) (citing Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 (1982) (addressing 
case with stipulated facts).) However, where the facts are disputed, a court is required 
to accept the petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true, but need not accept the 
petitioner's conclusions. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). 
Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there exists a 
material issue of fact. I.C. § 19-4906. When genuine issues of material fact exist that, if 
resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to relief, summary 
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Baldwin v. 
State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008). 
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the 
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a 
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court 
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determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions 
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903 
(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de nova. Owen v. 
State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997). 
C. The District Court Applied An Incorrect Standard To Conflicting Affidavits At The 
Summary Dismissal Stage 
At the summary dismissal hearing, the district court demonstrated that it had an 
incorrect understanding of post-conviction standards. (Tr.03/07/2013, p.11, Ls.3-14.) 
When the petitioner's attorney articulated the correct standard in that the facts should 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, at summary dismissal the 
district court said that was "not actually required" and that a different standard applied. 
(Tr.03/07/2013, p.11, Ls.3-14.) The district court applied an incorrect standard for 
summary dismissal. 
"Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the 
non-moving party." Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 144, 145 (2009) (emphasis added). 
Disputed facts must be construed in favor of the non-moving party, however, '"[w]hen an 
action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not constrained to draw 
inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment but rather the 
trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from 
uncontroverted evidentiary facts."' Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (quoting Loomis v. 
City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437 (1991)) (emphasis added). 
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This rule was taken from the prior civil case of Loomis v. City of Hailey. Loomis, 
in turn, dealt with a case in which the parties stipulated to the fact that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact - only questions of how the law should apply to the facts 
that were agreed upon by all parties. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 437. 
In Yakovac, the underlying operative facts were not in dispute by the parties, as 
they involved trial counsel's failure to make certain evidentiary objections - the absence 
of which was apparent from the face of the trial record. Id. at 444-447. Thus, this rule 
from both Yakovac and Loomis arose out of, and is expressly limited to, only those 
cases where there is no disputed evidence regarding the issue to be determined by the 
trial court for summary disposition purposes. 
The district court's understanding of the standard to be applied at summary 
dismissal was incorrect. The court erred when it did not view the disputed facts in the 
light most favorable to Mr. Salinas. As will be explained further below, applying the 
correct standard, Mr. Salinas is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 
D. A Material Issue Of Fact Exists On Whether Mr. Steveley Rendered Deficient 
Performance When He Failed To File A Timely Notice Of Appeal On Mr. Salinas' 
Behalf And Failed To Adequately Consult With Mr. Salinas About Filing An 
Appeal 
Mr. Salinas raised two claims involving his right to receive effective assistance of 
counsel involving his appellate rights. (R., pp.6-7.) His first claim involved 
Mr. Steveley's failure to file an appeal. (R., pp.6-7.) The second involved 
Mr. Steveley's failure to consult with him about filing an appeal. (R., pp.6-7.) 
The State moved on a general basis for summary dismissal because it believed 
Mr. Salinas asserted no material issue of fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. 
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(R., pp.58-67.) The State asserted that Mr. Salinas never requested an appeal. 
(R., p.65.) Additionally, the State gave notice that it wanted Mr. Salinas' claim that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to consult with him 
about his appellate rights dismissed. (R., pp.64-65.) Contrary to case law, the State 
argued that there is no duty to consult with the defendant about his appellate rights, 
especially when the district court advised a defendant that it has the right to an appeal. 
(R., pp.64-65.) 
The State then filed a supplemental notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.122-127.) 
Again, the State moved on a general basis for dismissal because no genuine issue of 
material fact existed and the claim that Mr. Salinas wanted an appeal filed was "patently 
false." (R., p.122.) Modifying its previous assertion that no duty existed to consult with 
Mr. Salinas about his appellate rights, the State reasoned that because Mr. Salinas 
received a more favorable deal than negotiated and the court advised him about his 
appellate rights, the attorney was not ineffective for failing to consult with Mr. Salinas. 
(R., pp.122-127.) The State concluded by asking the court to disbelieve Mr. Salinas' 
affidavit, give all weight to Mr. Steveley's affidavit, and dismiss the petition. (R., pp.123-
124.) 
The district court determined that Mr. Steveley did not render deficient 
performance. (R., pp.133-134.) After discrediting all of Mr. Salinas' pleadings,4 the 
court concluded that that Mr. Salinas never spoke with his trial attorney about filing an 
appeal, never requested an appeal be filed, nor reasonably conveyed that he was 
4 The district court's error is further elaborated on in Issue II. 
10 
interested in pursuing an appeal. (R., pp.133-134.) The district court concluded no 
genuine issue of material fact existed. (R., pp.128-135.) 
The district court's decision to summarily dismiss Mr. Salinas' petition for post-
conviction relief should be reversed because a genuine issue of material fact exists as 
to whether Mr. Salinas received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney 
failed to file an appeal and failed to consult with him about his appellate rights. 
1. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Standards 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant 
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of 
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). Further, the 
Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the 
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685. 
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's 
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on 
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's 
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the 
Amendment envisions." Id. The "proper measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. In light of the Sixth 
Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated that the starting point of evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the 
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American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,279 (1998). 
In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also 
must prove that he was prejudiced. "The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). 
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by 
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), 
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal 
proceeding would have been different, that decision would be 
"diametrically different," "opposite in character or nature," and "mutually 
opposed" to our clearly established precedent because we held in 
Strickland that the prisoner need only demonstrate a "reasonable 
probability that · ·· the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). 
Despite the general rule, a presumption of prejudice arises in certain instances. 
This presumption applies when there is a complete denial of counsel during a critical 
stage of the proceedings, when circumstances are such that the likelihood that any 
lawyer could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is 
appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial, and when counsel entirely 
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. See e.g., United 
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). 
12 
2. A Material Issue Of Fact Exists On Whether Mr. Salinas Instructed His 
Attorney To File An Appeal 
"The decision whether to prosecute an appeal rests with the defendant." Mata v. 
State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993). Idaho courts have repeatedly recognized 
that, "where a criminal defendant advises his attorney of his desire to appeal, and the 
attorney fails to take the necessary steps to file an appeal, such a defendant has been 
denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at a critical stage." 
Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 191, 194-195 (Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, the United States 
Supreme Court has, "long held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions to file 
a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable." Roe v. Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000). Counsel does not make a strategic decision as to 
whether to file an appeal. Id. Rather, "filing a notice of appeal is a purely ministerial 
task, and the failure to file reflect[s] inattention to the defendant's wishes." Id. Thus, in a 
post-conviction proceeding, the question is whether the defendant conveyed to his 
attorney that he wanted an appeal or the attorney understood that an appeal should be 
undertaken. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940 (Ct. App. 1990). 
The question presented in these types of cases is often whether the petitioner 
conveyed to his attorney a desire to file an appeal. In Sanders, a case that proceeded 
to an evidentiary hearing, the question was whether Sanders had told his attorney to file 
an appeal to challenge the sentence imposed. Id. The attorney testified that he could 
not recall being instructed to file an appeal and a second attorney, representing the 
petitioner during a sentence reduction proceeding, testified that the petitioner never 
mentioned filing an appeal nor inquired about his appeal. Id. Therefore, the district 
court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the petitioner 
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conveyed to his attorney that he wanted an appeal filed. Id. The Court of Appeals 
determined that the case presented a credibility determination and that sufficient 
evidence existed at the evidentiary hearing to support the district court's findings. Id. at 
941. 
Like the instant case, in a number of other Court of Appeals' cases, the district 
courts failed to recognize that a genuine issue of material fact existed. For example, in 
Mata, the Court of Appeals found that the petitioner's verified petition for post-conviction 
relief asserting that his attorney declined to file an appeal on the petitioner's behalf was 
sufficient to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Mata, 124 Idaho 588, 
593 (Ct. App. 1993). The case was remanded for the determination of whether Mata 
asked for an appeal to be filed. Id. In Ricca v. State, the petitioner asserted, in his 
petition, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to 
file an appeal despite his requests that one be filed. Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894 (Ct. 
App. 1993). The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court for an 
evidentiary hearing because a genuine issue of material fact existed. Id. The question 
to be decided was whether the petitioner communicated his intent to appeal to his 
attorney. Id. at 898. The court recognized that both the petitioner and the attorney may 
be called to testify at the evidentiary hearing to resolve the dispute before the district 
court. Id. 
Unlike Flores, Mata, and Ricca, supra, in State v. Beasley, a remand was 
unnecessary for the district court's factual determination of whether the defendant had 
made known to counsel his desire to appeal because it was undisputed that the 
petitioner had conveyed his desire to appeal and his attorneys understood that the 
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petitioner wanted an appeal filed. State v. Beasley, 126 Idaho 356, 360 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Therefore, no evidentiary hearing was required on the deficient performance prong of 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim that his attorney should have understood that 
the petitioner wanted an appeal filed. Id. 
In the instant case, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether 
Mr. Salinas instructed Mr. Steveley to file an appeal on his behalf. In his petition for 
post-conviction relief, Mr. Salinas asserted that his attorney did not file an appeal on his 
behalf, and he specified the non-frivolous issue that may have been raised, i.e., 
sentencing. (R., pp.6-7.) In further pleadings, Mr. Salinas noted that his attorney did 
not file an appeal on his behalf to challenge the sentence imposed. (R., p.92.) Finally, 
Mr. Salinas produced an affidavit asserting that he told Mr. Steveley to file an appeal 
and he failed to do so. (R., pp.116-117.) Mr. Steveley asserts that he was not 
instructed to file an appeal. (R., pp.126-127.) In the instant case, the operative facts 
are in dispute. Additionally, a probable inference that could be drawn from the evidence 
presented to the district court is that Mr. Salinas told Mr. Steveley's staff to do 
something about his sentence, which could have included an appeal. (Tr.03/07/2013, 
p.12, Ls.12-20.) Without the hearing, the court could not make a credibility 
determination. Yakovac, supra, does not support a conclusion to resolve the factual 
dispute without a hearing. The district court applied an incorrect standard when it did 
not construe the disputed facts in Mr. Salinas' favor. Without an evidentiary hearing, the 
district court could not have resolved the dispute. In light of Mr. Salinas' assertions, the 
district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim without an evidentiary hearing 
because he has submitted sufficient evidence that a genuine issue of material fact 
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exists as to whether Mr. Steveley had been instructed to file an appeal on Mr. Salinas' 
behalf. 
3. Material Issue Of Fact Exists On Whether Mr. Salinas Rendered 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To Consult With Mr. Salinas 
About His Appeal 
The United States Supreme Court has held that it is not always deficient 
performance to fail to consult with a client about whether to file an appeal. Roe v. 
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000). Prevailing professional standards establish that 
the decision of whether to file an appeal is ultimately to be made by the defendant, not 
the attorney. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function, 
(3d ed. 1991), Defense Function, Standard 4-5.2(a)(v). Counsel has a constitutionally 
imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to 
think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because 
there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant 
reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. Roe, 528 U.S. 
at 480. To "consult" with a defendant regarding filing an appeal has "a specific meaning-
advising the defendant about the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal, 
and making a reasonable effort to discover the defendant's wishes." Id. at 478. The 
United States Supreme Court expects that courts applying this test "will find, in the vast 
majority of cases, that counsel had a duty to consult with the defendant about an 
appeal." Id. at 481 . 
Mr. Salinas submits that his attorney had a duty to consult with him under either 
test. First, a rational defendant would want to appeal the sentence imposed. 
Mr. Salinas received a substantial sentence, twenty years and, although the fixed time 
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was five years less than recommended by the State, it is still substantial (five years). 
(Tr.09/15/2011, p.2, Ls.12-14; R., pp.5-6.) However, even assuming that this court is 
uncomfortable concluding that a rational defendant would want to appeal his sentence, 
a material issue of fact remains that Mr. Salinas reasonably demonstrated to counsel 
that he was interested in appealing. According to the register of actions of the 
underlying criminal case (attached as Appendix A), the Rule 35 motion was filed the 
same day as the judgment of conviction was filed, a clear indication that someone, i.e., 
Mr. Salinas, was not satisfied with the sentence imposed. The evidence presented by 
the State demonstrated that on November 14, 2012, Mr. Salinas was dissatisfied with 
the sentence imposed and contacted the public defender's office. (R, p.126.) If a client 
immediately seeks some relief from the sentence, the attorney, at a minimum has a duty 
to consult with the defendant to determine if the defendant wants to appeal the court's 
decision. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Mr. Steveley should 
have understood that Mr. Salinas was interested in appealing, triggering his duty to 
consult with Mr. Salinas. There is no evidence that Mr. Steveley discussed with 
Mr. Salinas the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal or made a 
reasonable effort to discover Mr. Salinas' wishes. See Roe, 528 U.S. at 478. 
Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether trial counsel rendered 
deficient performance when he failed to consult with Mr. Salinas about filing an appeal, 
and therefore, the matter should be remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
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4. Mr. Salinas Was Prejudiced By Mr. Steveley Failures Because Mr. Salinas 
Was Deprived Of Counsel At A Critical Stage Of The Proceedings And 
Denied Appellate Proceedings Altogether 
When an attorney renders deficient performance by failing to file a requested 
notice of appeal or by failing to properly consult with the defendant about an appeal, 
and that failure results in the forfeiture of an appeal, "counsel's deficient performance 
has deprived respondent of more than a fair judicial proceeding; that deficiency 
deprived respondent of the appellate proceeding altogether." Roe, 528 U.S. at 482-83. 
The denial of counsel during a critical stage and the resulting denial of an entire judicial 
proceeding "demands a presumption of prejudice." Id. 
Taking Mr. Salinas' factual assertions as true, prejudice is presumed in this 
instance. There is a genuine issue of material fact, which, if resolved in Mr. Salinas' 
favor, would entitle Mr. Salinas to relief such that the district court erred when it 
summarily dismissed this claim. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Find That Mr. Salinas Submitted Admissible 
Evidence For Consideration Of His Claims 
A Introduction 
The district court erred discrediting all of Mr. Salinas's pleadings. Because there 
are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Mr. Salinas received ineffective 
assistance of counsel, Mr. Salinas respectfully requests that the district court's order 
summarily dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel claims be vacated, and this 
case remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. 
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B. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Salinas' Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief Because Mr. Salinas Produced Sworn Pleadings 
Constituting Admissible Evidence To Support His Claims 
The district court discredited all of Mr. Salinas' evidence when ruling on the 
motion for summary dismissal. (R., p.133.) First, the district court erroneously found 
that, "The Petitioner did not file an affidavit with his petition to support his conclusory 
allegation." (R., p.133.) Then the court erred in concluding that Mr. Salinas failed to 
assert the facts in his petition to be true and correct as required by Idaho Code § 19-
4902. (R., p.133, n.2.) Then, the court discredited Mr. Salinas' affidavit drafted by his 
attorney. (R., p.133.) Finally, the court concluded that Mr. Salinas presented no 
admissible evidence for consideration of his claims. (R., pp.133-134.) 
Mr. Salinas asserts the district court erred in discrediting and ignoring all of his 
evidence and has misapplied the standard for reviewing summary dismissal motions. 
He contends he filed a verified petition, affidavits, pleadings, documents, and records 
that all support his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Idaho code section 19-4902 provides, in part: 
A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the 
applicant with the clerk of the district court in which the conviction took 
place .... Facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant and the 
authenticity of all documents and exhibits included in or attached to the 
application must be sworn to affirmatively as true and correct. The 
supreme court may prescribe the form of the application and verification.l5l 
I.C. § 19-4902 (emphasis added). Idaho Code§ 19-4903 provides: 
5 The verification provided by the Idaho Supreme Court is as follows: "I, _____ , 
being duly sworn upon my oath, depose and say that I have subscribed to the foregoing 
petition; that I know the contents thereof; and that the matters and allegations therein 
set forth are true." Idaho Criminal Rule 57. The verification utilized by Mr. Salinas is 
sufficiently comparable and contains the key language "true and correct" as required by 
the statute. I.C. § 19-4902. 
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The application shall identify the proceedings in which the applicant was 
convicted, give the date of the entry of the judgment and sentence 
complained of, specifically set forth the grounds upon which the 
application is based, and clearly state the relief desired. Facts within the 
personal knowledge of the applicant shall be set forth separately from 
other allegations of facts and shall be verified as provided in section 19-
4902. Affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations shall 
be attached to the application or the application shall recite why they are 
not attached. The application shall identify all previous proceedings, 
together with the grounds therein asserted, taken by the applicant to 
secure relief from his conviction or sentence. Argument, citations, and 
discussion of authorities are unnecessary. 
I.C. § 19-4903 (emphasis added). 
"A verified pleading that sets forth evidentiary facts within the personal 
knowledge of the verifying signator is in substance an affidavit, and is accorded the 
same probative force as an affidavit." Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. In Mata, the petitioner 
verified the petition consistent with Idaho Code § 19-4902. Id. at 593. He swore that 
the application was "true and correct." Id. Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that the State's argument that the petitioner failed to support his application with an 
affidavit as contemplated by the statute was without merit. Id. 
In this case, Mr. Salinas signed his petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.7.) 
He made an oath and had the oath notarized. (R., p.7.) The oath provided, "I am the 
Petitioner herein. I have read the enclosed Petition for Post Conviction Relief. I know 
the contents thereof and believe them to be true and correct to the best of my belief." 
(R., p.7.) The petition set out the evidentiary facts that were within Mr. Salinas' personal 
knowledge. He swore the information to be "true and correct." (R., p.7.) This is the 
exact language Idaho Code § 19-4902 utilizes. Thus, his petition is sufficient to 
constitute an affidavit. See Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. 
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In his petition, Mr. Salinas stated, "Counsel was ineffective when he did not seek 
to file an appeal of the sentence imposed; nor did he even speak to me regarding the 
possibility of filing an appeal of the sentence imposed." (R., pp.6-7.) Therefore, 
Mr. Salinas asserted two things in his affidavit. First, the trial attorney did not file an 
appeal to challenge the sentence imposed. (R., pp.6-7.) Second, the trial attorney did 
not consult with Mr. Salinas about appealing. (R., pp.6-7.) There is nothing more for 
Mr. Salinas to add or elaborate. These facts are in his knowledge and he has verified 
the facts to be true and correct. 
Mr. Salinas attempted to elaborate on his claim in the Petitioner's Response to 
Motion for Summary Dismissal, filed November 15, 2012. (R., pp.86-93.) Mr. Salinas 
attempted to point out the errors in the State's argument in that an attorney could be 
ineffective for failing to consult with his client about filing an appeal. (R., pp.90-92.) 
Again, Mr. Salinas asserts in this response, his attorney failed to consult with him about 
filing an appeal and failed to file an appeal on his behalf. (R., pp.90-92.) (Asserting, "as 
counsel did not speak to the Petitioner about filing an appeal" and "Counsel did not file 
an appeal of the sentence imposed.") Filing the pleadings pro se, Mr. Salinas 
attempted to swear to the accuracy of his statements. (R., p.93.) The asserted facts 
made in the response are no different than the facts asserted in his petition and should 
not have been discredited by the district court. 
On February 7, 2013, with the assistance of his attorney, Mr. Salinas filed an 
affidavit in support of his claims. (R., pp.116-117.) In this affidavit, Mr. Salinas 
asserted, "Immediately after my sentencing hearing I asked my attorney to appeal and 
file a motion to reduce my sentence." (R., p.116.) Mr. Salinas asserted that he was 
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sworn under oath, which indicated that the contents of the affidavit are true and correct. 
(R., p.116.) He signs the affidavit and it is notarized. (R., p.116.) This document is 
evidence pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 19-4902 and 4903 and should not have been 
discredited by the district court. 
Therefore, a verified petition may be sufficient to meet the requirements of 
I.C. § 19-4903. Id. According to I.C. § 19-4903, an applicant need not argue its facts, 
use citations to support its facts, or discuss any authority to support its factual 
contention of the errors made in the applicant's case. The applicant must present facts 
within the applicant's personal knowledge. I.C. § 19-4903. An applicant may support 
the petition with affidavits, records, or other evidence. I.C. § 19-4903. Here, 
Mr. Salinas provided a verified petition constituting an affidavit. He made assertion of 
facts from his personal knowledge and swore those facts to be true and correct. He 
provided a response which reiterated the previous assertions, and he again attempted 
to assert the facts as true and correct. He filed an affidavit prepared by his attorney 
taking an oath that the assertions made in the pleading were true and correct. 
Therefore, Mr. Salinas did provide admissible evidence to be considered for his claims.6 
6 As an aside, the district court gave significant weight to Craig Steveley's Affidavit 
although it lacked significant assertions of truth, more-so than any of Mr. Salinas's 
documents. In the Steveley Affidavit, the attorney asserted at the beginning of the 
document that he is "sworn." There is no assertion what he is sworn to do, such as, to 
tell the truth. Additionally, the document is simply notarized with no affirmation. The 
notarization does nothing more than to indicate that the person that signed the affidavit 
is Craig Steveley. The court's attempt to give all weight to this "affidavit" and none to 
Mr. Salinas' affidavit based on incorrect affirmations, verifications, or notarizations is 
disturbing. 
22 
111. 
Assuming That Mr. Salinas' Documents Lacked Sufficient Affirmation, The District 
Court's Decision To Dismiss The Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Based On This 
Rationale Should Be Reversed Because Mr. Salinas Lacked Any Notice That The 
District Court Would Be Ignoring His Evidence Based On This Reason, And Therefore, 
The Petition Was Dismissed On A Basis For Which He Had No Notice 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Salinas asserts that the district court dismissed his petitions on a basis for 
which he was not given any notice, by either the State or the district court. As such, 
Mr. Salinas was not afforded any notice of the reason for dismissal, and was also 
denied an opportunity to respond and attempt to cure any alleged defects in his petition. 
B. Mr. Salinas Received No Notice That The District Court Was Dismissing His 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief On The Basis That His Petition, Affidavit, And 
Other Evidence Were Not Sufficiently Certified To Be Admissible 
The UPCPA allows the district court to summarily dismiss a petition for post-
conviction relief on its own motion or in response to the State's motion. I.C. § 19-
4906(b) & (c). In either case, though, the petitioner must be given prior notice of the 
specific reason(s) for dismissal, as well as an opportunity to respond. I.C. § 19-4906(b); 
see Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322 (1995); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 
156, 159-60 (Ct. App. 1986); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The purpose of this requirement is to give the petitioner an opportunity to challenge the 
decision before it is finalized. Baruth, 110 Idaho at 159-60. Thus, this requirement is 
strict; it makes no difference whether the petitioner's claims are meritorious or not. 
Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho 128, 129-30 (1978). A case may not be dismissed on 
grounds for which the petitioner received no notice. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 
676 (2010) (the court's notice was inadequate, however, the district court erred when it 
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failed to summarily dismiss the petition on grounds asserted by the State in its motion 
for summary dismissal). An assertion that the petitioner received no notice of the 
reasons for dismissal may be asserted for the first time on appeal. See Kelly v. State, 
149 Idaho 517, 522 (2010). 
In the instant case, Mr. Salinas received no notice that the district court as 
discredited all of his affidavits, petitions, and other evidence because an improper 
affirmation had been provided. Had the district court or the State provided notice of the 
improper affirmation, the problem could have been easily remedied by Mr. Salinas and 
his attorney. Failure to give notice, deprived Mr. Salinas of any real opportunity to 
respond. Therefore, this Court should remand the matter for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Salinas respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 13th day of January, 2014. 
· NE M. WALKER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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APPENDIX A 
Idaho Repository - Case History Page 
Cases for: Salinas, Arturo 
Ada 
6 Cases Found. 
State of Idaho vs. Arturo Salinas 
No hearings scheduled 
Page 1 of 9 
CR-FE-2011-
Case: 0011897 District Judge: D~rl_a S. Amount$2 409_60 Closed pending Williamson due: ' clerk action 
Charges: Violation Date Charge Citation Degree Disposition 
Felony Finding: Guilty 
Disposition 
08/03/2011 I18-907(1)(A) 
Battery-Aggravated 
(Cause Great Bodily 
Harm or Disability) 
Officer: Ada Co 
Officer-Generic,, AD 
08/03/2011119-2520 
Enhancement-Use of a 
Deadly Weapon in 
Commission of a 
Felony 
Officer: Ada Co 
Officer-Generic,, AD 
Felony 
date: 11/10/2011 
Fines/fees: $225.50 
Credited time (Yes): 
130 days 
Det Penitentiary: 5 
years 
Indet Penitentiary: 15 
years 
Finding: Guilty 
Disposition 
date: 11/10/2011 
Fines/fees: $0.00 
Register 
of Date 
actions: 
08/04/2011 New Case Filed - Felony 
08/04/2011 Prosecutor assigned Julianne Meehan 
08/04/2011 Hearing Scheduled (Video Arraignment 08/04/2011 01:30 PM) 
0810412011 Hearing ~esult for Vi?eo Arraignment scheduled on 08/04/2011 01:30 PM: Arraignment/ First Appearance 
08/04/2011 Order Appointing Public Defender Ada County Public Defender 
08/04/2011 Judge Change: Administrative 
08/04/2011 Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 08/17/2011 08:30 AM) 
0810412011 BOND SET: at 300000.00 - (I18-907(1)(A) Battery-Aggravated (Cause Great Bodily Harm or Disability)) 
08/04/2011 Order Appointing Public Defender 
08/04/2011 Order Appointing Public Defender 
08/05/2011 Notification of Penalties for Escape 
08/10/2011 Motion For Bond Reduction 
08/10/2011 Notice Of Hearing 
08/10/2011 Defendant's Request for Discovery 
0811712011 Hear!ng result for Preliminary scheduled on 08/17/2011 08:30 AM: Hearing Held 
0811712011 Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on 08/17/2011 08:30 AM: Bound Over (after Prelim) 
08/17/2011 Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 09/01/2011 09:00 AM) 
08/17/2011 Commitment 
08/19/2011 Motion to Consolidate/FE-2011-10039 
1-.ttnc·//nmmr irl£'1111rto;: 11,;:frpnr,o;:itnrv/r!'!sf'T-listnrv rln?m!'!Det::iil=ves&schema=ADA&nartvSea ... 1/9/2014 
Idaho Repository - Case History Page 
08/22/2011 Information 
Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 09/01/2011 09:00 AM: 
09/01/2011 District Court Arraignment- Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff Number of 
Pages: Less than 100 
09/01/2011 Hearing Scheduled (Entry of Plea 09/15/2011 08:30 AM) 
09/01/2011 Order to Consolidate (with CRFEll-10039) 
Hearing result for Entry of Plea scheduled on 09/15/2011 08:30 AM: 
09/15/2011 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff Number of 
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100 
09/15/2011 Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 11/03/2011 10:00 AM) 
0911512011 A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (l18-907(1)(A) Battery-Aggravated (Cause Great Bodily Harm or Disability)) 
0911512011 A Plea is entere~ for char~e: - GT (119-2520 Enhancement-Use of a 
Deadly Weapon in Comm1ss1on of a Felony) 
09/15/2011 Guilty Plea Advisory 
0911512011 Order for Pre-Sentence Investigation Report and Mental Health 
Assessment 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 11/03/2011 10:00 AM: 
11/03/2011 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff Number of 
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100 
11/03/2011 Hearing Scheduled (Disposition 11/10/2011 10:00 AM) 
Hearing result for Disposition scheduled on 11/10/2011 10:00 AM: 
11/10/2011 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff Number of 
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100 
ll/l0/2011 Finding of Guilty (l18-907(1)(A) Battery-Aggravated (Cause Great 
Bodily Harm or Disability)) 
Sentenced to Jail or Detention (l18-907(1)(A) Battery-Aggravated 
ll/l0/2011 (Cause Great Bodily Harm or Disability)) Confinement terms: Credited 
time: 130 days. Penitentiary determinate: 5 years. Penitentiary 
indeterminate: 15 years. 
ll/l0/2011 Sentenced To Pay Fine 225.50 charge: l18-907(1)(A) Battery-
Aggravated (Cause Great Bodily Harm or Disability) 
11/10/2011 Order for Restitution and Judgment 
ll/l0/2011 Findin~ o'. Guilty (119-2520 Enhancement-Use of a Deadly Weapon in 
Comm1ss1on of a Felony) 
11/10/2011 STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action 
ll/l0/2011 No Contact Order: Criminal No Contact Order Filed Expiration Days: 
7305 Expiration Date: 11/10/2031 
11/10/2011 Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's office. 658. 74 victim # 1 
ll/l0/2011 ~estitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's office. 1296.67 victim # 
11/15/2011 Judgment & Commitment 
11/15/2011 Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and for Leave 
12/01/2011 Objection to Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and For Leave 
12/07/2011 Order Denying Motion to Reduce Sentence 
CR-FE-2011-
Case: 0010039 
State of Idaho vs. Arturo Salinas 
No hearings scheduled 
M . t t J d David E. Amount$O 00 ag1s ra e u ge: Day due: • 
Disposition 
Closed 
Charges: Violation Date Charge 
07/03/2011 I18-907(1)(A) 
Citation Degree 
Felony 
Finding: Dismissed 
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